The Case
The thesis is one claim, testable: firmed 24×7 power delivered on-site from an inland corridor costs 30–60% less than firmed 24×7 coastal supply, for workloads that can consume power where it is generated. This page defends the claim, sizes the fit, and cites the precedents that either support or challenge it.
The Cost Ladder
Four figures matter. The ladder shows how each transformation adds delivered cost.
| Transformation | A$/MWh | What It Buys |
|---|---|---|
| Solar LCOE only | 40–55 | Inland, single-axis tracking. Not firm. |
| + short-duration BESS (1–4 hr) | 60–80 | Daytime and evening loads. Not continuous industrial firming. |
| + 24×7 firm to 99% availability, on-site | 80–120 | The load the corridor is built for. |
| + transmitted to coast | 110–180 | Uneconomic against coastal delivered firm. |
Solar levelised cost of energy (LCOE) — inland, single-axis tracking. A$40–55/MWh — derived from the GenCost 2025-26 large-scale PV range[1] at inland capacity factors of 22–24%[2]. Full derivation on the Assumptions page. Depends on capex per MW (A$0.9–1.2M at scale), capacity factor (22–24% inland), and financing (debt/equity mix, WACC 6–8% for institutional infra).
Solar + short-duration battery energy storage (BESS), 1–4 hr. A$60–80/MWh. Sufficient for daytime and evening loads, not for continuous industrial firming.
Solar + BESS, 24×7 firm to 99% availability. A$80–120/MWh. Storage-to-generation ratio is 6–10 GWh per GW installed — driven by winter dispatch, not annual energy. This is the load the corridor is built for. TASC estimate — model and assumptions published here.
Solar + BESS firmed + transmitted to coast. A$110–180/MWh. Long-distance HVAC or HVDC adds A$10–30/MWh in transmission losses and capex recovery. The corridor is uneconomic for coastal load at this level.
Comparison point. Delivered firm power to a Sydney or Melbourne data centre in 2028–2030, on a merchant-plus-PPA basis, sits at A$130–190/MWh as at Aug 2026 — a TASC estimate built from ASX Energy Cal-28/29 baseload futures (August 2026)[3] plus firming and network costs; the decomposition is on the Assumptions page. The corridor’s on-site number (A$80–120/MWh) sits materially below that. The corridor’s transmitted-to-coast number (A$110–180/MWh) overlaps and does not clear it. That is the entire thesis, priced.
The Workload Fit
Compute and processing workloads sort on two axes: latency tolerance (how far from users they can sit) and power intensity (MW per rack, in the compute case; MWh per tonne, in the processing case). The corridor’s cost advantage matters only in the upper-right quadrant.
Fits the corridor:
- AI training (foundation models, fine-tuning). 40–200 MW per campus. Tolerant of 50–100 ms round-trip time (RTT).
- Batch compute (rendering, simulation, backup indexing). Tolerant of asynchronous scheduling.
- Sovereign cold storage. Latency-tolerant by definition.
- HPC research (weather, genomics, materials). Batch-scheduled.
- Crypto mining. Not a policy priority, mentioned for completeness.
Does not fit the corridor:
- Cloud regions serving consumer traffic (Sydney and Melbourne exist for a reason)
- Live AI inference to users
- Online gaming, fintech, high-frequency trading, CDN edge
- Anything requiring <10 ms RTT to eastern-seaboard populations
- Light manufacturing, assembly, or logistics-flow-bound industry
Industrial loads that fit the corridor:
- Critical minerals refining
- Refined alumina
- Battery precursors
- RO desalination at industrial scale
- Magnesium
- Urea
These qualify on energy share of operating cost rather than on latency, which is why they sit outside the scatter above. See System Layer 4 for the screen and the exclusions.
Hyperscalers already stratify their infrastructure this way — training regions and inference regions are separate campuses in separate places. The corridor plays for the training side of that split.
Precedent
The corridor is not without reference points. Six projects, actively delivered or under construction, calibrate what has and hasn’t worked at inland-Australian scale.
| Project | Scale | Announced Capex | Status (Q3 2026) | What It Tells Us |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sun Cable / AAPowerLink[4][5] | ~20 GW solar + ~36 GWh storage; HVDC to Darwin and Singapore (initial ~6 GW tranche) | ~A$40B | Owned by Grok Ventures after 2023 administration and Squadron’s exit; targeting operations from ~2035; submarine cable approvals continuing as at Aug 2026 | Inland solar at multi-GW scale is fundable; the export cable, not the generation, is the binding constraint |
| Western Green Energy Hub[6] | up to 70 GW solar + wind in current filings (announced at ~50 GW, 2021), WA Goldfields | Not costed | Approvals and design phase as at Aug 2026 | Demonstrates the resource case at continental scale; consent and offtake unresolved |
| Asian Renewable Energy Hub[7][8] | ~26 GW solar + wind, Pilbara | ~A$36B+ | Federal environmental rejection 2021; restructured; operator bp exited February 2026, project continuing under remaining partners as at Aug 2026 | Risk: an “all of it” pitch invites an “all of it” rejection |
| CopperString 2.0[9][10] | 1,100 km HVAC, 330 kV, Townsville–Mt Isa | ~A$13.9B (Queensland state-owned; initial 2020 estimate A$1.8B) | Under construction; completion by 2029, commissioning expected 2031; QIC seeking private co-investment as at Aug 2026 | Enabling transmission attracts public balance sheets — and estimates can triple; budget for that pattern rather than arguing it away |
| Snowy 2.0[11][12] | 2,200 MW pumped hydro | A$12B+ (over budget) | Construction; commissioning delayed as at Aug 2026 | Warning: long-build infrastructure drifts on cost and schedule |
| Project EnergyConnect[13] | ~900 km HVAC, NSW–SA interconnect | Transgrid section A$3.6B (budgeted A$2.1B); SA section on time and on budget | Energised June 2026 as at Aug 2026 | Even the successful precedent ran ~70% over on its long section — treat delivery risk as the norm the staging must absorb |
Two structural lessons.
Sun Cable’s difficulty was not the generation — it was the export cable. That validates the corridor’s core siting logic: consume the electrons where they are produced.
AREH’s rejection was structural. A single ~26 GW proposal presented to Commonwealth approval processes as one event was too large to approve. The corridor’s staging is deliberate on that basis — Gate 1 is a single node at ~1–2 GW, not a continent-spanning system.
Scale, Honestly Stated
The full-build envelope is meaningful for planning, not for pitching.
Base-case full build: ~120 GW installed solar across the corridor, ~231 TWh/year, ~26.4 GW continuous output.
For context, the NEM consumed 213 TWh in 2023–24 (including rooftop solar)[14] and WA’s main grid roughly 20 TWh more. The corridor at full build (~231 TWh/year) is a system of comparable scale to both grids combined.
But: full build assumes 25–30 years of successful staging past Gate 4. The site defends 1–2 GW at Gate 1 (2028–2032) and 5–15 GW at Gate 2 (2033–2038). Everything beyond that is conditional on the first two gates working.
Sources
- CSIRO, GenCost 2025-26 Final Report, 2026-07. link Accessed 2026-08. Large-scale PV LCOE ranges; storage capex tables B.4–B.6; system-level firmed renewables $141–152/MWh (grid scope, incl. transmission & integration).
- World Bank / Solargis, Global Solar Atlas, 2026. link Accessed 2026-08.
- ASX Energy, Australian electricity baseload futures (Cal-28/Cal-29), 2026-08. link Accessed 2026-08. Volatile — refresh the accessed date whenever the forward-curve claim is re-verified.
- SunCable, SunCable moving forward under new ownership, 2023-09. link Accessed 2026-08.
- PV Tech, Grok acquires all of SunCable's assets, 2023-09. link Accessed 2026-08.
- PV Tech, 70GW WGEH seeks WA EPA approval, 2025. link Accessed 2026-08. TODO: replace with the WA EPA referral document.
- Commonwealth (EPBC), AREH — 'clearly unacceptable' decision, 2021-06. link Accessed 2026-08. TODO: replace with the EPBC decision notice itself.
- PV Tech, bp exits 26GW Australian Renewable Energy Hub, 2026-02. link Accessed 2026-08.
- ABC News, CopperString cost rises to $13.9 billion, 2025-04-08. link Accessed 2026-08.
- Queensland Government, Budget 2026-27 — CopperString commitment (A$3.2B), 2026-06. link Accessed 2026-08. TODO: replace this secondary link with the Qld budget paper itself.
- Australian National Audit Office, Delivery of Snowy 2.0 (performance audit), 2025. link Accessed 2026-08.
- ABC News, $12 billion Snowy 2.0 — timeline and cost, 2026-02. link Accessed 2026-08.
- RenewEconomy, EnergyConnect energised after delays and cost overruns, 2026-06. link Accessed 2026-08.
- Australian Energy Regulator, State of the Energy Market 2024 — ch.2 National Electricity Market, 2024. link Accessed 2026-08. NEM consumption 213 TWh in 2023-24, including rooftop solar.
Challenge this.
This site exists to be broken before anything is built. If you can show the cost ladder is wrong, the storage ratio is optimistic, or a precedent is misread — say so.
Dispute a number → · Review the assumptions → · Traditional Owner organisations: engagement belongs with your Land Council or NTRB, not this form.